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1. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78A-4-103(2)(h) in that this
appeal arises from the final judgment of the District Court, the Honorable Stephen L.
Henriod presiding, which involved a domestic relations resolving all matters, including
custody and parent-time, after a Bifurcated Divorce Decree. Although the Honorable Stephen
L. Henriod stated his decision and Judgment on the record (Record, pages 149 and 150;
Record, pages 202-2 through 202-7), he subsequently left the bench and Judge Henriod's
statements relating to custody and child support calculations were thereafter interpreted by
the Honorable Robert Adkins (Record, page 1681), which has resulted in this appeal.
2. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE # 1: Did the District Court err in awarding child support pursuant to the Utah Child
Support Guidelines by employing the Sole Custody Worksheet to calculate the amount of base child
support rather than the Joint Custody Worksheet?
DETERMINATIVELAW:UtahCodeAnn.78B-12-102(14);f/rf);v. Udy,S93Y.2d
1097 (Utah App. 1995). The Udy court held that "Although labeled 'sole custody/ the trial court
awarded Mr. Udy visitation that exceeded the threshold for joint physical custody.... Thus, the court
must follow the mandate of Utah's child support guidelines, and use the joint custody child
support worksheet or makefindingsof fact justifying its deviation." Udy v. Udy, supra, at 1099
[emphases added].
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"We have consistently held that the proper

interpretation of a statute is a question of law that should be reviewed for correctness." State v.
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 14,127 P.3d 682, 686.

1

It should be notes that even though the Minutesfromthe May 23,2011 telephone
conference are confusing and ambiguous ("Court orders the child support is to be calculated as to
petitioner having sole legal custody and joint legal custody." Emphasis added), the parties
understood that Judge Adkins meant that child support should be calculated as to petitioner
having sole physical custody.
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3, STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §783-12-102(14) states:
"'Joint physical custody' means the child stays with each parent
overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents
contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support."
4. STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves a dispute over the calculation

of child

support.

Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter Father) contends that the Joint Physical Custody
Worksheet should be used in calculating child support due to the fact that he was awarded
approximately 160 overnights with the minor child and Petitioner/Appellee (hereinafter
Mother) argues that the Sole Custody Worksheet should be used merely because Judge
Henriod awarded her "physical custody."
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod on July 8,2010, the court found that
it would be in the best interest of the parties' minor child that Mother have "physical
custody" of the minor child (Record, pages 150,202-4; see, also, Judgment, Record, page
190, numbered paragraph 1). The court further found that it would be in the best interest of
the minor child that the parties share "Joint Legal Custody" of the minor child (Record, pages
150, 202-4; see, also, Judgment, Record, page 190, numbered paragraph 1). Father was
awarded parent-time with the parties' minor child in an amount equal to approximately 160
overnights per year (Record, pages 150, 202-4)2. The court made findings regarding the
income of each party, but did not calculate the child support to be ordered (Record, pages

2

This is Respondent's calculation based on the number of nights per year that Judge
Henriod awarded to Respondent/Father. See, also, Record, pages 159-163.
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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149,202-6). Father's attorney was ordered to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law as well as the final Decree of Divorce (Record, page 149).
Pursuant to the parent-time Order, Father's counsel calculated child support using the
Joint Custody Worksheet of the Utah Child Support Guideline. Mother's counsel objected,
asserting that sole physical custody was awarded to Mother based on Judge Henriod's
verbiage "physical custody" (see, Record, page 152, ^2).
Due to the retirement of Judge Henriod, the Honorable Robert Adkins was assigned
to the case. Judge Adkins held a telephonic conference on May 23, 2011 with counsel for
both Mother and Father. After argument by counsel, the court held that the base amount of
child support would be assessed pursuant to the Sole Custody Worksheet (Record, page 168).
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Father contends terms and verbiage do not control the manner in which child support
is calculated but that the statutory manner in which child support is calculated is determined
by the number of overnights that each parent is awarded. Even if an error in terminology is
made, the counting of the overnights is what is important and what determines whether the
Sole Physical Custody Worksheet is used or whether the Joint Physical Custody Worksheet
is used.
The term "physical custody" is vague and gives absolutely no guidance regarding the
manner in which one should calculate child support. To determine which Worksheet to use,
one is required to ascertain the number of overnights that each parent has been awarded by
the court. Other terms such as "primary custodial parent" which is used extensively in Utah
does not convey an absolute awareness of whether the "primary custodial parent" has Sole
Physical Custody or whether the "primary custodial parent" shares Joint Physical Custody.
As will be seen and established hereinafter, the law and the facts of this case clearly
and categorically result in the conclusion that the term "physical custody" as used by Judge
Henriod meant "primary custodial parent" and nothing more. Mother is erroneously
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contending that the use of these terms results in a Sole Physical Custody Order by Judge
Henriod.
7. ARGUMENT
Child support "is intended to be a shared obligation of both parents/' Thronson v.
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), and should be used to "assure the children a
standard of living comparable to that which they would have experienced if no divorce had
occurred." ,4//ra/ v. Allred, 191 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Ostler v. Ostler,
789 P.2d 713,716 (Utah App. 1990)). Both the custodial and non-custodial parents have the
same duty to support their child. Alfred, supra, at 1112 (Utah App. 1990).
Joint Physical Custody exists when a "child stays with each parent overnight for more
than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to
paying child support." Utah Code Ann, § 78B-12-102(14). In Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097
(Utah App. 1995), Ms. Udy argued that the trial court had discretion to use the sole custody
worksheet in determining child support because she was awarded "sole" custody of the
parties' child. Udy, supra, at 1100:
"Ms. Udy contends that the trial court did not err when it
awarded child support based upon a sole custody worksheet. She
argues that because the trial court awarded her'sole' custody of
Joshua and granted Mr. Udy only 'expanded' visitation, the
court had the discretion to apply the sole custody worksheet. We
are not persuaded. Labels do not control the child support
determination. This court indicated in Thronson v. Thronson,
810 P.2d 428, 429 n. 1 (Utah App. 1991), that the labels
'custody' and 'visitation' ascribed by the trial court are not as
important as the description given by the court in defining their
meaning in the context of a given case."
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As is clearly and unequivocally set forth in Udy, "labels do not control the child support
determination" and that, despite the "sole custody" label, Mr. Udy received visitation
exceeding the joint physical custody threshold under § 78-45-2(10) [now § 78B-12-102(14)]
requiring the court to use either the joint custody child support worksheet, or to justify any
deviation through Findings of Fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-202(3) (cited in Udy as
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) (Supp.1994)); Udy, at 1100 (citing AUred, at 1111 (Utah App.
1990)).
Findings of Fact must explain the reason for any deviation and why a guideline-based
calculation is inequitable. Udy, at 1100. Findings must also be "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached." AUred, supra, at 1111 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Acton v.
Deliran, 111 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). If the court's findings sufficiently rebut the
guidelines, it must then consider the following and any other relevant factors in determining
support: "(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the relative wealth and
income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn; (d) the ability of the obligee to
earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the
adult child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the
needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others." Utah Code Ann. §
78B-12-202(3). In AUred, the lower court's findings were held insufficient because it lacked
any findings regarding the total needed amount of monthly child support, and failed to
explain how it ultimately decided support—instead the court relied on a figure the parties
previously stipulated as a possible support amount. AUred, at 1111 (Utah App. 1990).
None of the foregoing requirements were considered by Judge Henriod who did
nothing more than to state the words "physical custody" and then set forth the parent-time
plan which amounted to 160 overnights per year with Father. Attached as Addendum 2 is a
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

true and correct copy of the transcript of the Judgment/Order proceedings and/or Findings
of Fact and Judgment by Judge Henriod which states the following with regards to Custody
and Parent-time:
"Custody. Physical custody of Joey to the petitioner, j oint
legal custody. The advisory guidelines - and Counsel knows
what that means, and you folks will get copies - will be part of
this judgment.
Parent time, the statutory holiday schedule, alternate
weeks, Friday night, Saturday night and Sunday night, which
you've been doing. On the off week, two overnights. That will
be Thursday and Friday so that Mr. Goldsmith can keep Joey
longer on Friday because he doesn't work on Friday. So I'd say
4 o'clock he gets returned, unless there's a reason to do
otherwise, and that's when he's not in school. Otherwise he gets
returned to school in the morning."
Addendum 2: Judge's Ruling, page 4, lines 10-21
Judge Henriod's again refers to "physical custody" a bit further into his Judgment,
which further supports Father's position that the term does not impact or determine the
manner in which the calculation of child support occurs.
"Now, having physical custody doesn't mean the physical
custodian can change any parent time schedule or interfere with
phone calls. It doesn't mean that you can block the defendant or respondent from taking Joey to visit his paternal parents
which you did."
Addendum 2: Judge's Ruling, page 5, lines 4 - 8

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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t

If the custodial parent cannot change parent-time, then the custodial parent has no ability to
change or adjust child support as child support is calculated by determining how many
overnights per year a parent receives.
More incriminating is to look at the Child Support Calculators which are found on the
Utah State Court's website where it is stated when to use the "Sole Custody Calculator" and
when to use the "Joint Custody Calculator."
"Sole Custody Calculator
The Sole Custody Calculator is used when the
non-custodial parent has fewer than

111

overnights a year with the children. If overnights
are not specified in your order, the Sole Custody
Calculator is usually appropriate where the order
refers to the custody arrangement as sole legal and
sole physical or Joint legal and sole physical or
joint legal with primary physical, or where one
parent receives custody under an order that
contains language similar to: permanent care
control and custody of the children.
Joint Custody Calculator
The Joint Physical Custody calculator is used
when each parent has more than 110
overnights a year with the children." [Emphasis]
Both dad and mom have more than 110 overnights per year in this case and, as such, the Joint
Custody Calculator must be used.
When entering the Judgment regarding child support, Judge Henriod stated:

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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id suppor it i;v ill be based upon imputed income to the
petitioner of $5,800 a month. That's based upon the figures
contained in affidavits that she's filed cirIivi in tins ease I'm
specifically finding voluntary unemployment, and also on her
testimony today that she's not going to apply for just any job.
'•' .-'•":. .'• '••

I he re spoi idei it's incoi ne w ill be $5,100 a n lonth ' I his child

• •• ••• ••

support goes back to the date of the complaint.
It will be offset with — I don't know what that number's
going to be. I didn't do a worksheet, bi it it w ill be offset b> the
amounts paid by Mi Goldsmith, which Ms. Larsen testified
were 200 a month from April through June, from Ji il> '08 tc
December 09 300 a month, and $495 a month since January.'
Addendum 2: Judge's Ruling, page 6, lines 1-13 [Emphasis added]
Judge Henriod made absolutely no findings • • -i*

• .

. .

t

Nr( j

calculation would be inequitable. He stated what the income of the parties would be and
further stated that he did not do a worksheet. The requirements of Udy9 Allred and Utah Code
Ann. 78B-I .V202(3)were neither addreissed, norsalistied V such then; tan he nodn union
from the guideline support.
The Honorable Judge Adkins did not attempt to change Judge Henriod's Judgment

because of the use of the terms ""physical custody," then the Sole Physical Custody
Worksheet should be used. This was clearly an error of law and an abuse of Judge Adkins
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one has 160 overnights per year: there exists a JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY relationship
and the Joint Custody Worksheet MUST, AS A MATTER OF LAW, be used.
Any deviation from the above principles and law must be supported by the Findings
of Fact with a finding of those elements and circumstances set forth in Utah Code 78B-12202(3). Respondent first prepared the Findings of Fact as Ordered by Judge Henriod. See,
Addendum 3. After the hearing with Judge Adkins, it was Ordered to change 119 of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, however, the court nonetheless has not included
a specific explanation for its use of the Sole Custody Worksheet in calculating child support.
See, Addendum 4 and Record, pages 179-185. Respondent was awarded more than 110
overnights per year, granting him 30% or more of the year's total overnights, as was the case
in Udy. Thus, because child support was calculated using the Sole Custody Worksheet, the
court should have made Findings of Fact and explained how these findings warrant deviation
from the guidelines. Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah App. 1995).
According to % 19 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared on May
23,2011 and entered on June 20,2011 (Record, pages 179-185), the court has not included
a specific explanation for its use of the Sole Custody Worksheet in calculating child support.
Unless more detailed findings for this guideline departure appear in the court's Order, the
court has Failed this requirement, making its Order erroneous and ripe for amendment and/or
reversal. Allred, at 1111 (Utah App. 1990).
8. CONCLUSION
A label of "sole" custody does not trigger the use of the Sole Custody Worksheet. A
label of "physical custody" does not trigger the use of the Sole Custody Worksheet. And, visa
versa. Instead, both parents have the same burden to provide child support, regardless of the
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label, and the amount of that burden is determined h\ In1 .miomil >t overnights per > ear.
Because Respondent has more than 30% of the overnights in a year, he is entitled to a child
suppo^

the Joint Custody Worksheet, unless the trial court

sets forth specific Findings that warrant deviation The t ouil in llns case departed IT in the
guidelines but failed to state specific reasons for such departure, which it could not have
done because

*

f,

I \UTC stated by Judge Henriod which are set forth

in \ddendum 2 H specific findings and related reasoning do not appear

11 the

Order/Judgment, then no deviationfromthe guidelines are permissible.
For the reasons srt lorlli .ibm t, ml is u ^petltulh >iihmilted that the trial court [Judge
Adkins] erred and abused its discretion in Ordering that the Sole Custody Worksheet must
be used It is therefore requested that this matter be remanded with instructions to amend the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ol'l aw ;nul Indgniitiii in ii'dVci thai On Imni 1 nstod>
Worksheet be used.

DATED: March 15 2012

•

Respectfully submitted,

* K^tssL—
Attorney for RespondentXAppellarit,
WILLARJD LEROY GOLDSMITHIV
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
It is hereby certified that the word counter in WordPerfect which was used to create this
Opening Brief indicates that the length of the Opening Brief is 3228 words.

DATED: March 15,2012

By:

—•

—TONC.jom^

Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
1. Statutes Referred to in Appellant's Brief
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78B-12-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78B-12-204(1).
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services or the Department of
Human Services.
(3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the Office of Recovery
Services, the Department of Human Services, or an administrative agency of another state or
other comparable jurisdiction with similar authority to that of the office.
(4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered and is calculated iising
the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," "base child support
obligation table," "low income table," or "table" means the appropriate table in Part 3, Tables.
(6) "Cash medical support" means an obligation to equally share all reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of children
(7) "Child" means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated,
self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the normal
and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a
member of the armed forces of the United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able to
provide somefinancialresources to the family, is not able to support self by own means.
(8) "Child support" means a base child support award, or a monthlyfinancialaward for
uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for the support of a child, including current
periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue under an order for current periodic payments, and
sum certain judgments awarded for arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs.
(9) "Child support order" or "support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a tribunal
whether interlocutory orfinal,whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance,
paternity, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwi.se which:
(a) establishes or modifies child support;
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or
(c) establishes child support or registers a child support order under Chapter 14, Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act
(10) "Child support services" or "IV-D child support services" means services provided
pursuant to Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 651 et seq.
(11) "Court" means the district court or juvenile court.
(12) "Guidelines" means the directions for the calculate u i and application of child support in
Part 2, Calculation and Adjustment.
(13) "Income" means earnings, compensation, or other payment due to an individual,
regardless of source, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, pay,
allowances, contract payment, or otherwise, including severance pay, sick pay, and incentive pay.
"Income" includes:
(a) all gain derivedfromcapital assets, labor, or both, including profit gained through
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sale or conversion of capital assets;
(b) interest and dividends;
(c) periodic payments made under pension or retirement programs or insurance policies of any
type;
(d) unemployment compensation benefits;
(e) workers'compensation benefits; and
(f) disability benefits.
(14) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than
30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support.
(15) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related insurance costs.
(16) "Obligee" means an individual, this state, another state, or another comparable
jurisdiction to whom child support is owed or who is entitled to reimbursement of child support
or public assistance.
(17) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(18) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human
Services.
(19) "Parent" includes a natural parent, or an adoptive parent
(20) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at least one of the
children.
(21) "State" includes any state, territory, possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable
domestic or foreign jurisdiction.
(22) "Temporary" means a period of time that is projected to be less than 12 months in
duration.
(23) "Third party" means an agency or a person other than the biological or adoptive parent or
a child who provides care, maintenance, and support to a child.
(24) "Tribunal" means the district court, the Department of Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services, or court or administrative agency of any state, territory, possession of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American
Tribe, or other comparable domestic or foreign jurisdiction.
(25) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs for up to a full-time
work week or training schedule as necessitated by the employment or training of a parent under
Section 78B-12-215.
(26) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base child support award.
Amended by Chapter 142,2009 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B12J)10200.ZIP 4,498 Bytes

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

78B-12-202. Determination of amount of support- Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order unless
there has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the obligor or obligee or
adjustment under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) has been made.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic adjustment for
prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a
showing of a material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award required by
the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction of
income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, or a
petition to modify an order under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) has been filed, the court
determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award
of child support using the guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an
existing award may be granted
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish
support after considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
• (b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult
child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall detennine and assess all arrearages based
upon the guidelines described in this chapter.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RENEE SPALL-GOLDSMITH,
Petitioner,
Case No. 084300172

vs.
WILLARD L. GOLDSMITH, IV,
Respondent.

Judge's Ruling
Electronically Recorded on
July 8, 2010

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Third District Court Judge
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Olivia D. Uitto
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JOLLEY & JOLLEY
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-2P R O C E E D I

NGS

(Electronically recorded on July 8, 2010)
THE COURT: Okay, everybody's here.
record.

We're on the

I'm going to ask Mr. Jolley to prepare findings and

a judgment, and I'm going to —
rulings, I have a few comments.

before I get into the direct
I found the petitioner's

testimony to be evasive manipulation in attempt to continue
to be over-controlling.

I believe she's been over-controlling

through the entire period of the parties' separation, and would
like to continue to do so.

If she does, that will be contrary

to the best interest of Joey.. On the contrary, I found the
respondent's testimony to be straightforward and credible.
A word about the motion for DNA testing.

That motion

was morally and ethically wrong, and potentially extremely
harmful to Joey and to the respondent.

It had —

if it had

been done, it would have been an attempt to bastardize a child,
and no parent should ever want to do that to a child.
is —

this is again for —

This

I missed your current last name.

MS. LARSEN: Larsen.
THE COURT: Larsen.

This is mostly for Ms. Larsen.

Unfortunately, maybe for you and certainly for me, I am now
in charge of your parent time situation, because you folks
haven't worked it as well as you should have, and that's mostly
due to Ms. Larsen.

You cannot change Court orders regarding

parent time, period, even though you're going to have physical
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-3custody.

Do you understand what I'm saying?
MS. LARSEN: Yes.
THE COURT: If you decide it's not going to be

excuse me —

—

good for Joey to spend time with his father for

whatever reason, and he comes back here to Court, you will go
to jail.

That's a promise.

You don't interfere.

You don't interfere with telephone time either, and
what you testified you did is interfering with telephone time.
He calls, you miss the call, you get the voice message, you
say, nJoey, it's time to call your father back now," and you
hand him the phone.
You do not give a 7-year old the option to do something
different.

When he's 15, that will be different, but a 7-year-

old doesn't get to decide whether he goes for parent time or
not.

That applies to you, sir, too.

Doesn't get to decide

whether he makes a phone call or not.

He doesn't.

That puts

way too much pressure on the child, and it should never happen.
Joey and his dad can talk as many times as they want
during the day, as long as it's not during sleeping time, and
it isn't what we'd call harassment.

I think everybody except

possibly Ms. Larsen understands what that means.

Just reason-

able times when you need to talk, or want to talk.
Now, football and golf are wonderful activities.
are in the best interest of the child.

They

Neither parent is ever

ordered to pay the cost of that kind of activity.

Good parents
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-4who are concerned about the welfare of their child will share
those expenses, ail other things being equal; but there's going
to be no Court order beyond the child support. That's something
you have to work out voluntarily.
I found insufficient evidence to make a finding of
fact that the $20,000 went into the house as a down payment/
or even that it came from the personal injury settlement.

I

also found insufficient evidence to make a finding of fact that
there is any equity in the marital home.
Custody.

Physical custody of Joey to the petitioner,

joint legal custody.

The advisory guidelines —

and Counsel

knows what that means, and you folks will get copies —

will be

part of this judgment.
Parent time, the statutory holiday schedule, alternate
weeks, Friday night, Saturday night and Sunday night, which
you've been doing.

On the off week, two overnights.

That

will be Thursday and Friday so that Mr. Goldsmith can keep
Joey longer on Friday because he doesn't work on Friday.

So

I'd say 4 o'clock he gets returned, unless there's a reason to
do otherwise, and that's when he's not in school.

Otherwise he

gets returned to school in the morning.
Don't enroll Joey in activities that interfere with
the other parent's time without the agreement of the other
parent, and without attempting —

you should attempt to accom-

modate what Joey wants and what's good for him.

I think foot-
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-5ball, soccer, golf, any of that is good for him, but it has
to be done jointly, and has to be done with Joey's welfare in
mindNow, having physical custody doesn't mean the physical
custodian can change any parent time schedule or interfere with
phone calls.
—

It doesn't mean that you can block the defendant

or respondent from taking Joey to visit his paternal parents

which you did.
Frankly, given the testimony I heard about the
dysfunctional relationship between Ms. Larsen and her parents,
I can't see how she can criticize the relationship between Joey
and any other grandparents.

Again, you don't give a 7-year-old

a choice about spending parent time or making telephone calls
or anything else.

You tell him what he needs to do.

Both parents need to be flexibleaccommodate Joey and the other parent.

They need to

Means if you can't

decide, the schedule controls; but if you can agree on other
changes, that will be in Joey's best interest and you should
try to do that.
You need to understand, the older he gets the more
flexible you've got to become.

At 7 you can control him.

15 he's going to be controlling you.

At

He's going to tell you

he's too busy, he's got things to do at school; and if you want
him to continue to have a good relationship with him, you're
just going to have to roll with it.

That's the way it works.
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-6Child support will be based upon imputed income to the
petitioner of $5,800 a month.

That's based upon the figures

contained in affidavits that she's filed earlier in this case.
I'm specifically finding voluntary unemployment/ and also on
her testimony today that she's not going to apply for just any
job.

The respondent's income will be $5,100 a month.

This

child support goes back to the date of the complaint.
It will be offset with —

I don't know what that

number's going to be, I didn't do a worksheet, but it will be
offset by the amounts paid by Mr. Goldsmith, which Ms. Larsen
testified were 200 a month from April through June, from July
*08 to December *09, 300 a month, and $495 a month since
January.
If the parties have evidence to prove that that was
different, then whether it benefits either party, they are
welcome to provide that information to Counsel and make that
adjustment.

Any payments that Mr. Goldsmith made to things

like football or golf will be counted as child support for
purposes of determining what that arrearage amount might be.
As far as the real property is concerned, anything
that went into the house was comingled, became joint property.
As I said before, I don't have enough evidence to make any
finding that there's anything in terms of equity in this home.
The home is awarded to the petitioner —

or to the respondent,

and he assumes all debt incurred with it.
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~7
1 I
2

Marital debt —
—

we're talking about the credit cards

the amounts will be established either as of the day of

3 I divorce, April of x09 or today with respect to each amount,
4

whichever is lower.

So if they've been paid down since April

5

of *09, the parties —

Mr. Goldsmith, who I guess would have

6 I paid it down, gets the benefit of that.

I guess it would

7 I accrue to Ms. Larsen, because I'm going to order that that is
8

marital debt, and the parties will share it equally.

9 J

Now, the way you handle that is up to Counsel.

10

can offset it.

You

If there's going to be an arrearage against

11 I Mr. Goldsmith, for instance, on the child support, that can
12

be offset on the marital debt.

The IRS is a joint debt.

13

petitioner is awarded the Volvo, subject to its indebtedness.

14

Counsel, anything I've missed?

15

MR. JOLLEY: No, your Honor.

16 I

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

17 I

(Judge's ruling concluded)

Court's adjourned.
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VERNON C. JOLLEY 6906
JOLLEY & JOLLEY, A Professional Law Corporation
9710 South 700 East, Suite 111
Sandy, Utah 84070
Fax:(801)495-1444
Telephone: (801) FATHERS
(801)495-1442
Attorney for Respondent: WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

RENEE SPALL-GOLDSMITH,
Petitioner,

Case No. 084300172
vs.
Judge: HENRIOD

WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV,

Commissioner: TACK
Respondent
This matter was tried to the bench on the 8th of July, 2010 on the Petitioner's Complaint and
Respondent Counterclaim for Divorce. Petitioner was represented by OLIVIA D. UITTO and
Respondent was represented by VERNON C. JOLLEY. The Court heard testimony from the
Petitioner and the Respondent, various other witnesses, received exhibits and heard arguments from
counsel. After a short recess, the Court made the following Findings ofFact, Orders, Judgments and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following Findings of Fact to be in the best interests of the parties and their
minor child Joey:
INITIAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Petitioner was evasive, manipulative and attempted to continue to be over-

controlling as the custodial parent If she continues in such actions, it will be against the best
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interests of Joey.
2.

Respondent was straight-forward and credible.

3.

Petitioner's request for DNA testing was morally and ethically wrong. It was also

potentially extremely harmful to Joey and to Respondent. It was an attempt to bastardize the child
and no parent should ever want to do that.
4.

Petitioner has changed court Orders concerning parent-time and has changed court

Orders concerning parent-time. Petitioner hasinterferedwithparent-timeandisnotto interfere with
parent-time or telephone time. If she does, she will go to jail.
5.

Petitioner has given Joey the option of whether Joey will call back his father and she

shall not give Joey the option whether to call back his father or not
6.

The Court finds that Respondent and Joey may talk as manytimesas they want during

the day as long as it is reasonable and not harassment to Petitioner or during sleeping time.
7.

Football and golf are wonderful activities and are in the best-interests of the child.

Neither parent is ordered to pay for those activity. Good parents will share these expenses. But there
is no court Order to pay these expenses.
8.

There was insufficient evidence to find that $20,000 went into the house as a down

payment or that it camefromPetitioner's personal injury settlement
9.

The Court finds that there is no equity in the home.
CUSTODY

10.

With regards to custody, the courtfindsthat it would be in the best interests of Joey

that Petitioner will have physical custody of the minor child. The court finds that it would be in the
best interests of Joey that Petitioner and Respondent will have Joint Legal Custody of the minor
child.
11.

The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the parties and Joey that the Advisory
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Guidelines as found in Utah Code Ann, 30-3-2 and 30-3-3 be implemented and will be part of the
court's Order.
PARENT-TIME
12.

The court finds the following parent-time schedule to be in the best interests of the

minor child. Parent-time shall follow the statutory holiday schedule. The parties shall have
alternating weekends and Respondent will have two overnights on off weeks, that is, during those
weeks where Petitioner has the following weekend with Joey. These additional parent-time days will
be Thursdays and Fridays, which means that Respondent will pick-up Joey on Wednesdays and
return on Fridays prior to Petitioner's scheduled weekend parent-time thereby resulting in
Respondent having Wednesday and Thursday nights with Joey on the weeks following Respondent's
weekend parent-time.
13.

The court finds that the parties shall not enroll Joey in activities that interfere with

other parent's time without consulting the other parent.
14.

The courtfindsthat activities such as golf, football, and soccer are good for Joey, but

these activities must be done jointly and with Joey's welfare in mind.
15.

The court finds that physical custody does not mean that you can change parent-time

or phone schedules. The Petitioner cannot block Respondent from taking Joey to paternal
grandparents. Joey does not get a choice. Joey needs to be told what to do and that parent-time is
important.
16.

The courtfindsthat parents shall be flexible and agree on changes that would be die

best interests of Joey. The older Joey gets, the more flexible the parents need to become. At seven
years old, Joey is easy to control. At fifteen years old, he will control the parties.
CHILD SUPPORT
17.

For computation of child support, the court finds evidence sufficient to imputed

$5,800 per month to the Petitioner. This is based uponfiguresfromaflSdavits from Petitioner. The
3
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Court specificallyfindsvoluntary unemployment for the Petitioner and based on testimony that she
is not just going to apply "for just any job."
18.

The Courtfindsthe Respondent's income to be $5,100 per month.

19.

The Courtfindsthat child support is retroactive to the date of the Complaint. It shall

be offset by amounts previously paid by Respondent Lee Goldsmith. These amounts were: $200 per
month for April through June of 2008, $300 per month for July 2008 through December 2009 and
$495 per month since January 2010.
20.

If parties have evidence that this is different they can provide that information to

counsel and make an adjustment for purposes of child support.
21.

Any past payments for things like football or golf that Respondent may have paid may

be counted towards child support
PROPERTY
22.

The courtfindsthat anything that came into the house became co-mingled and

joint-property.
23.

The Courtfindsthat there is no equity in home.

24.

The courtfindsthat the home should be awarded to Respondent and that he should

assume all debt associated with the home.
MARITAL DEBT
25.

The Court finds that amount of credit card debt will be established from date of

divorce, May 8,2009 or July 8,2010, whichever is lower. The courtfindsthat the credit card debt
is marital debt and shall be divided equally. Counsel for both sides can determine how to handle this
division. It can be offset with any arrears of the Respondent
26.

The Courtfindsthat the IRS debt is a joint debt.

27.

The Courtfindsthat the Petitioner should be awarded the Volvo.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the parties, having previously been granted a Bifurcated

Decree of Divorce, are still subject to the jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's
Findings of Facts and that the Findings of Fact as set forth above are consistent with law and equity.
2.

The Court concludes that the terms, conditions and Findings on the matters tried on

the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce are in the best interests of the parties and their minor child, that the
terms are fair and reasonable, and all other issues of dispute have been resolved with the Court
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.

SIGNED and DATED this

day of

, 2010.

BY THE COURT

THE HONORABLE JUDGE HENRIOD
Third District Court Judge
Approval as to form
Olivia D.Uitto
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
You are hereby given notice, pursuant to Rule 7(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that they
undersigned attorney will submit the above foregoing order for signature by the court, upon the
expiration of 5 daysfromthe date of this notice, plus 3 days for mailing, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time.
Dated: September 15,2010

:

VERNON CJOLLEY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing document identified as FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on the
following named persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Olivia D. Uitto, Ph.D.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171
DATED: September 15,2010

By:
VERNON C.JOLLEY
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ADDENDUM
4. Modified Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law Ordered by Judge Adkins and
signed by Judge Adkins on June 20,2011
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VERNON C. JOLLEY 6906
JOLLEY & JOLLEY, A Professional Law Corporation
9710 South 700 East, Suite 111
Sandy, Utah 84070
Fax:(801)495-1444
Telephone: (801) FATHERS
(801)495-1442
Attorney for Respondent: WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

RENEE SPALL-GOLDSMITH,
Petitioner,

Case No. 084300172
vs.
Judge: ADKINS
•WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV,
Commissioner: TACK
Respondent.
This matter was tried to the bench on the 8th of July, 2010 on the Petitioner's Complaint and
Respondent Counterclaim for Divorce. Petitioner was represented by OLIVIA D. UITTO and
Respondent was represented by VERNON C. JOLLEY. The Court heard testimony from the
Petitioner and the Respondent, various other witnesses, received exhibits and heard arguments from
counsel. After a short recess, the Court made the following Findings of Fact, Orders, Judgments and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following Findings of Fact to be in the best interests of the parties and their
minor child Joey:
INITIAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Petitioner was evasive, manipulative and attempted to continue to be over-

controlling as the custodial parent. If she continues in such actions, it will be against the best
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interests of Joey.
2.

Respondent was straight-forward and credible.

3.

Petitioner's request for DNA testing was morally and ethically wrong. It was also

potentially extremely harmful to Joey and to Respondent. It was an attempt to bastardize the child
and no parent should ever want to do that.
4.

Petitioner has changed court Orders concerning parent-time and has changed court

Orders concerning parent-time. Petitionerhasinterferedwithparent-timeandisnotto interfere with
parent-time or telephone time. If she does, she will go to jail.
5.

Petitioner has given Joey the option of whether Joey will call back his father and she

shall not give Joey the option whether to call back his father or not
6.

The Courtfindsthat Respondent and Joey may talk as many times as they want during

the day as long as it is reasonable and not harassment to Petitioner or during sleeping time.
7.

Football and golf are wonderfiil activities and are in the best-interests of the child.

Neither parent is ordered to pay for those activity. Good parents will share these expenses. But there
is no court Order to pay these expenses.
8.

There was insufficient evidence to find that $20,000 went into the house as a down

payment or that it camefromPetitioner's personal injury settlement.
9.

The Courtfindsthat there is no equity in the home.
CUSTODY

10.

With regards to custody, the courtfindsthat it would be in the best interests of Joey

that Petitioner will have physical custody of the minor child. The court finds that it would be in the
best interests of Joey that Petitioner and Respondent will have Joint Legal Custody of the minor
child.
11.

The Courtfindsthat it is in the best interest of the parties and Joey that the Advisory
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Guidelines as found in Utah Code Ann. 30-3-2 and 30-3-3 be implemented and will be part of the
court's Order.
PARENT-TIME
12.

The courtfindsthe following parent-time schedule to be in the best interests of the

minor child. Parent-time shall follow the statutory holiday schedule. The parties shall have
alternating weekends and Respondent will have two overnights on off weeks, that is, during those
weeks where Petitioner has the following weekend with Joey. These additional parent-time days will
be Thursdays and Fridays, which means that Respondent will pick-up Joey on Wednesdays and
return on Fridays prior to Petitioner's scheduled weekend parent-time thereby resulting in
Respondent having Wednesday and Thursday nights with Joey on the weeks following Respondent * s
weekend parent-time.
13-

The courtfindsthat the parties shall not enroll Joey in activities that interfere with

other parent's time without consulting the other parent.
14.

The courtfindsthat activities such as golf, football, and soccer are good for Joey, but

these activities must be done jointly and with Joey's welfare in mind.
15.

The courtfindsthat physical custody does not mean that you can change parent-time

or phone schedules. The Petitioner cannot block Respondent from taking Joey to paternal
grandparents. Joey does not get a choice. Joey needs to be told what to do and that parent-time is
important
16.

The courtfindsthat parents shall beflexibleand agree on changes that would be the

best interests of Joey. The older Joey gets, the moreflexiblethe parents need to become. At seven
years old, Joey is easy to control. At fifteen years old, he will control the parties.
CHILD SUPPORT
17.

For computation of child support, the court finds evidence sufficient to imputed

$5,800 per month to the Petitioner. This is based uponfiguresfromajBSdavitsfromPetitioner. The
3

:

"
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Court specificallyfindsvoluntary unemployment for the Petitioner and based on testimony that she
is not just going to apply 'for just any job/9
18.

The Courtfindsthe Respondent's income to be $5,100 per month.

19.

The Courtfindsthat the Child Support Obligation Worksheet for Sole Custody is

appropriate in this case. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Based thereon, the base child
support amount payable by Respondent to Petitioner is $509.00 per month. The Courtfindsthat child
support is retroactive to the date of the Complaint It shall be offset by amounts previously paid by
Respondent Lee Goldsmith. These amounts were: $200 per month for April through June of 2008,
$300 per month for July 2008 through December 2009 and $495 per month since January 2010.
20.

If parties have evidence that this is different they can provide that information to

counsel and make an adjustment for purposes of child support.
21.

Any past payments for things like football or golf that Respondent may have paid may

be counted towards child support.
PROPERTY
22.

The courtfindsthat anything that came into the house became co-mingled and

joint-property.
23.

The Courtfindsthat there is no equity in home.

24.

The court finds that the home should be awarded to Respondent and that he should

assume all debt associated with the home.
MARITAL DEBT
25.

The Court finds that amount of credit card debt will be established from date of

divorce, May 8,2009 or July 8,2010, whichever is lower. The courtfindsthat the credit card debt
is marital debt and shall be divided equally. Counsel for both sides can determine how to handle this
division. It can be offset with any arrears of the Respondent.
26.

The Courtfindsthat the IRS debt is a joint debt.
4
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27.

The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded the Volvo.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1;

The Court concludes that the parties, having previously been granted a Bifurcated

Decree of Divorce, are still subject to the jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's
Findings of Facts and that the Findings of Fact as set forth above are consistent with law and equity.
2.

The Court concludes that the terms, conditions and Findings on the matters tried on

the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce are in the best interests of the parties and their minor child, that the
terms are fair and reasonable, and all other issues of dispute have been resolved with the Court
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.

SIGNED and DATED this

day of

, 2011.

BY THE COURT

THE HONORABLE JUDGE ADKINS
Third District Court Judge
Approval as to form
Olivia D.Uitto
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
You are hereby given notice, pursuant to Rule 7(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that they
undersigned attorney will submit the above foregoing order for signature by the court, upon the
expiration of 5 daysfromthe date of this notice, plus 3 days for mailing, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time.
Dated: May 23,2011
John J, Diamond
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing document identified as FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on the
following named persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Olivia D. Uitto, Ph.D.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171
DATED: May 23,2011
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of
the document described as AMENDED APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF on the following
named persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
OLIVIA D. UITTO, Ph.D.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 711872
Salt Lake City, UT 84171

Two (2) Copies

Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee

DATED: March 15,2012
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